Greenhill, K. M. (2010). Weapons of mass migration: Forced displacement, coercion, and foreign policy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

One refugee is novelty, ten refugees are boring and a hundred refugees are a menace.

p. 12
Chapter 1. Understanding the Coercive Power of Mass Migration
Coercive: the practice of inducing or preventing changes in political behavior through the use of threats, intimidation, or some other form of pressure – most commonly, military force.
This book focuses on a very particular non-military method of applying coercive pressure – the use of migration and refugee crisis as instrument of persuasion.
traditional international relations suggest that it is not effective thus used rarely, This book will claim the opposite.
p. 13 “contrary to conventional wisdom, these unnatural disasters are relatively common.
my note: Naomi Klein in her “Shock Doctrine (http://www.naomiklein.org/shock-doctrine) talks about  Disaster Capitalism and lays out a strong theory how natural disasters start being used for ruining economies and countries to take over to the point, when greediness raises to the level of seeking to provoke disasters, so economies and countries can be taken over.
p.13 Defining, measuring and Identifying Coercive Engineering Migration,
p. 15 Despite the advent of 1951 United Nation Refugee Convention
p. 19 after all, what leader wants to voluntarily admit having been forced to offer concessions to actors, who are commonly portrayed in the media and public fora not as formidable adversaries but, rather, as pathetic foes worthy of derision – for instance, a “tin-pot-dictator” like Fidel Castro or an “obsequious” “tyrant” as Erich Honecker?
p. 23 Who engages in it?
3 types:
generators – Fidel Castro, Idi Amin
agents provocateurs – Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale, Kosovo Liberation Army (p. 27). p. 29 generating a crisis can help level the playing field, enhance the credibility of weak actors, increase the potency of their threats, and thereby improve their coercive capabilities in several distinct ways.
opportunists.
p. 30 passive exploiters: opportunists . Austria 1956 toward Hungarian refugees, asking for assistance. p. 31 Thailand in the 1980s, Cambodian refugees for assistance from the US. Pakistan in the 1980s  to turn General Zia Ul-Haq from a pariah to a respectable politician.
p. 43 Resistors and restrictionists.
In 2004 survey, 52 percent of Americans polled claimed that the present level of immigration presented a “critical threat to the vital interests of the US,” and 76 percent favored “restricting immigration as a means of combating terrorism.” In a separate 2008 survey, 61 percent said that “controlling and reducing illegal immigration “should be a very important US foreign policy goal. In 2007, Europeans ranked immigration behind only fighting crime as the most important policy issue facing the US in coming years
p. 46 protectors and promoters
p. 48 when protection collides with rejection, vulnerability results
p. 54 fleeing from Communism during the Cold War: “on the other hand, they did “not want to encourage more refugees to come” because they “would never be genially welcomed.” p. 55 this tendencies continued after the COld War: 1998 Kurds in Germany
p. 56 hypocrisy cost
p. 60 Why Liberal Democracies are Particularly Vulnerable
to hypocrisy costs: because of normative (or embedded) liberalism p. 61 transparent and inherently conflictual nature of political decision making within these states (political liberalism)

Chapter 2
p. 75 The 1994 Cuban Balseros Crisis and its Historical Antecedents