Posts Tagged ‘political science’

fake news hybrid war

https://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000006188102/what-is-pizzagate.html

Russia and far right spreading disinformation ahead of EU elections, investigators say

‘The goal here is bigger than any one election. It is to constantly divide, increase distrust and undermine our faith in institutions and democracy itself’
Matt Apuzzo, Adam Satariano 2019-05-12T13:13:04+01:00″

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-elections-latest-russia-far-right-interference-fake-news-meddling-a8910311.html

Global world affairs

Former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel‘The World Is Changing Dramatically’

Former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel speaks to DER SPIEGEL about his call for the country to take on a new global role and why Germans are underestimating the dangers posed by the current geopolitical situation.

Interview Conducted by  and Britta Sandberg September 24, 2018  04:32 PM

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/interview-with-former-german-foreign-minister-sigmar-gabriel-a-1229393.html

Now Trump is criticizing us for not spending enough money on our military. Part of the truth, however, is that the U.S. wanted exactly that for a very long time. They were worried that too much military power in Germany could provoke the next world war. I once told Tillerson, I don’t know what you are complaining about, you raised us for 70 years to be peaceniks. Now that’s what we are and you’re surprised. He laughed.

Some people want Germany to be something like a large Switzerland, but we are simply too big. We can’t just stand on the sidelines. Because of the Assad regime’s bombs, almost a million refugees were standing in front of our door. It’s not just about military operations, but about crisis prevention, diplomacy, economic development. Germany shouldn’t transform from a geopolitical abstainer to an influential geo-strategist. I wish that we would return to once again having strategic debates — no matter the result. It is important to prepare the public for the fact that the world has changed.

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more on political science in this IMS blog
http://blog.stcloudstate.edu/ims?s=political+science

Identity Politics New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy

Fukuyama, F. (2018). Against Identity Politics: The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy. Foreign Affairs97(5), 90–114. Retrieved from http://login.libproxy.stcloudstate.edu/login?qurl=http%3a%2f%2fsearch.ebscohost.com%2flogin.aspx%3fdirect%3dtrue%26db%3dkeh%26AN%3d131527250%26site%3dehost-live%26scope%3dsite

For the most part, twentieth-century politics was defined by economic issues. On the left, politics centered on workers, trade unions, social welfare programs, and redistributive policies. The right, by contrast, was primarily interested in reducing the size of government and promoting the private sector. Politics today, however, is defined less by economic or ideological concerns than by questions of identity. Now, in many democracies, the left focuses less on creating broad economic equality and more on promoting the interests of a wide variety of marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, women, and lgbt people. The right, meanwhile, has redefined its core mission as the patriotic protection of traditional national identity, which is often explicitly connected to race, ethnicity,
or religion.

Again and again, groups have come to believe that their identities—whether national, religious, ethnic, sexual, gender, or otherwise—are not receiving adequate recognition. Identity politics is no longer a minor phenomenon, playing out only in the rarified confines of university campuses or providing a backdrop to low-stakes skirmishes in “culture wars” promoted by the mass media. Instead, identity politics has become a master concept that explains much of what is going on in global affairs.

Democratic societies are fracturing into segments based on ever-narrower identities,
threatening the possibility of deliberation and collective action by society as a whole. This is a road that leads only to state breakdown and, ultimately, failure. Unless such liberal democracies can work their way back to more universal understandings of human dignity,
they will doom themselves—and the world—to continuing conflict.

But in liberal democracies, equality under the law does not result in economic or social equality. Discrimination continues to exist against a wide variety of groups, and market economies produce large inequalities of outcome.

And the proportion of white working-class children growing up in single-parent families rose from 22 percent in 2000 to 36 percent in 2017.

Nationalists tell the disaffected that they have always been core members of a great
nation and that foreigners, immigrants, and elites have been conspiring to hold them down.

Orban Hungary populism

PODCAST – Dean Starkman: “We are looking at the Golden Age of Public Corruption”

PODCAST – Dean Starkman: “We are looking at the Golden Age of Public Corruption”

Разговор с американския журналист Дийн Старкман, който е един от редакторите на Paradise Papers и има над 20-годишен…

Posted by America for Bulgaria on Monday, May 7, 2018

Dean Starkman is a fellow at Center for Media, Data and Society and a visiting lecturer at the School of Public Policy at Central European University, Budapest. He and Ben Novak discuss the challenges facing public interest journalism, the transformation of journalism as whole, and where things are going from here.

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more on Hungary in this IMS blog
http://blog.stcloudstate.edu/ims?s=hungary

more on populism in this IMS blog
http://blog.stcloudstate.edu/ims?s=populism

Social Democrats in Disarray

What’s Left?: Social Democrats in Disarray

Alan Johnson Summer 2015

Why has the right, including the populist right, rather than the left, been the main political beneficiary of the anger and bitterness that has roiled Europe since the 2008 financial crash, the eurozone crisis, and the resulting deep recession and brutal austerity? After all, these events surely proved the relevance of the left’s critique of capitalism.

The left is increasingly marginal to political life in Europe despite the fact that, in the words of Owen Jones, an important voice of the British left, “Living standards are falling, public assets are being flogged to private interests, a tiny minority are being enriched at the expense of society and the hard-won gains of working people—social security, rights in the workplace and so on—are being stripped away.” And the radical parties and movements to the left of the social democratic parties have been faring no better. In the brutally honest assessment of the British Marxist Alex Callinicos, “Nearly seven years after the financial crash began, the radical left has not been weaker for decades.”

But the European left’s inability to forcefully meet the crisis is not due to a failure of individual political leaders, but the fact that it has not developed, in theory or practice, a response to the three great waves of change—economic, socio-cultural, and politico-intellectual—that have crashed over it since the late 1970s.

The fruits of this radical transformation of European social democracy into a political force pursuing a slightly kinder and a slightly gentler neoliberalism—which some dub “social neoliberalism”—have been bitter.

While capital is global, mobile, and regnant, organized labor is increasingly deindustrialized, indebted, and precarious; often temporary, part-time, insecure, and, quite frankly, unorganized.

an explosion of inequality, relative poverty, and acquisitive individualism.

The manic, pathological quality of neoliberal consumerism has produced an explosion of personal debt.

the crisis of the European left is also intellectual.

 

Lin Chun China expert

Chun, L. (2017). Discipline and power: knowledge of China in political science. Critical Asian Studies49(4), 501-522. doi:10.1080/14672715.2017.1362321

http://login.libproxy.stcloudstate.edu/login?qurl=http%3a%2f%2fsearch.ebscohost.com%2flogin.aspx%3fdirect%3dtrue%26db%3daph%26AN%3d125811392%26site%3dehost-live%26scope%3dsite

Lin Chun or ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Chun_Lin18

p. 501 – is political science “softer” than the other soft social sciences?
thus…  political science “may never live up to its lofty ambition of scientific explanation and prediction. Indeed, like other social sciences, it can be no more than a ‘ science in formation’ permanently seeking to surmount obstacles to objectivity.”

p. 502 disciplinary parochialism
the fetishes of pure observation, raw experience, unambiguous rationality, and one-way causality were formative influences in the genesis of the social sciences. the ‘unfortunate positivism” of such impulses, along with the illusion of a value-free science, converged to produce a behavioral revolution in the interwar period Behaviorism was then followed through an epistemological twist, by boldly optimistic leaps to an “end of ideology” and ultimately to a claimed “end of history” itself.

p. 503
early positivism was openly underpinned by an European condescension toward Asians’ “ignorance and prejudice.” Behind similar depictions lay a comprehensive Eurocentric social and political philosophy.
this is illustrated its view of China through the grand narrative of modernization.

p. 504
Robert McNamara famously reiterated that if World War I was a chemist’s war and Word War II a physicist’s, Vietnam “might well have to be considered the social scientists’ war.”

Although China nominally remains a communist state, it has doubtlessly changed color without a color revolution.

p. 505
In the fixed disciplinary eye, “China” is to specific to produce anything generalizable beyond descriptive and self-containing narratives. The area studies approach, in contrast to disciplinary approaches, is all about cultural, historical, and ethnographic specificities.

If first-hand information contradicts theoretical conclusions, redress is sought only at the former end (my note – ha ha ha, such an elegant but scathing criticism of [Western] academia).

The catch [is] that Chinese otherness is in essence not a matter of cultural difference (hence limitations of criticizing Eurocentrism and Orientalism) and does not merely reproduce itself by inertia.
Given a long omitted self-critical rethinking of the discipline’s parochial base, calling for cross-fertilizing alone would be fruitless or even lead only to a one-way colonization of seemingly particularistic histories by an illusive universal science.

p. 506
political culture, once a key concept of political science’s hope for unified theorization, has turned out to be no answer
Long after its heyday, modernization theory – now with its new face of globalization – remains a primary signifier and legitimating benchmark. To those, who use it to gauge developments since 1945, private property and liberal democracy are permanent, unquestioned norms that are to be globally homogenized.
Moreover, since modernity is assumed to be a liberal capitalists condition, the revolutionary nationalism of an oppressed people remaking itself into a new historical subject noncompliant with capitalism cannot be modernizational.

p. 507
Political scientists and historical sociologists… saw the communist in power as formidable modernizers, but distinguished the Maoist model from the Stalinist in economic management and campaign politics.
Their analyses showed how organic connections between top-down mobilization and bottom-up participation cultivated in an active citizenry and high intensity politics. My note: I disagree here with the author, since such statement can be arbitrary from a historical point of view; indeed, for a short period of time, such “organic connection” can produce positive results, but once calcitrated (as it is in China for the past 6-7 decades), it turns stagnant.

p. 510
the state’s altered support base is essentially a matter of class power, involving both adaptive cultivation of new economic elites and iron-fist approaches to protest and dissent. By the same weight of historical logic, the party’s internal decay, loss of its founding ideological vision and commitment, and collusion with capital will do more than any outside force ever could do to destroy the regime.
That the Party stays in power is not primarily because the country’s economy continues to grow, but is more attributable to a residual social reliance on its credentials and organizational capacities accumulated in earlier revolutionary and socialist struggles. This historical promise has so far worked to the extent that cracks within the leadership are more or less held in check, resentment against local wrongs are insulated from central intentions, and social policies in one way or another respond to common outcries, consultative deliberations, and pressure groups.

p. 511
The word “madness” has indeed been freely employed to describe nations and societies judged inept at modern reason, as found in contemporary academic publications on epi- sodes of the PRC history.
My note: I agree with this – the deconstructionalists: (Jaques Derrida, Tzvetan Todorov) linguistically prove the inability of Western cultures to understand and explain other cultures. In this case, Lin Chun is right; just because western political scientist cannot comprehend foreign complex societal problems and/or juxtaposing them to their own “schemes,” prompts the same western researchers to announce them as “mad.”

p. 513aa
This is the best and worst of times for the globalization of knowledge. In one scenario, an eventual completion of the political science parameters can now seal both knowledge, sophisticatedly canalized, and ideology, universally uncontested – even if the two are never separable in the foundation of political science. In another scenario, causes and effects no longer rule out atypical polities, but the differences are presented as culturally incompatible. In either case, the trick remains to let anormalies make the norms validate preexist- ing disciplinary sanctions.

p. 514
Overcoming outmoded rigidities will nurture a robust scholarship committed to universally resonant theories.

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more on China in this IMS blog
http://blog.stcloudstate.edu/ims?s=china

globalization economy democracy

Caldwell, C. (April, 2017). Sending Jobs Overseas. CRB, 27(2).

http://www.claremont.org/crb/article/sending-jobs-overseas/ 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claremont_Institute

Caldwell’s book review of
Baldwin, Richard E. The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016. not at SCSU library, available through ILL (https://mplus.mnpals.net/vufind/Record/008770850/Hold?item_id=MSU50008770850000010&id=008770850&hashKey=cff0a018a46178d4d3208ac449d86c4e#tabnav)

Globalization’s cheerleaders, from Columbia University economist Jagdish Bhagwati to New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, made arguments from classical economics: by buying manufactured products from people overseas who made them cheaper than we did, the United States could get rich concentrating on product design, marketing, and other lucrative services. That turned out to be a mostly inaccurate description of how globalism would work in the developed world, as mainstream politicians everywhere are now discovering.

Certain skeptics, including polymath author Edward Luttwak and Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, put forward a better account. In his 1998 book Turbo-Capitalism, Luttwak gave what is still the most succinct and accurate reading of the new system’s economic consequences. “It enriches industrializing poor countries, impoverishes the semi-affluent majority in rich countries, and greatly adds to the incomes of the top 1 percent on both sides who are managing the arbitrage.”

In The Great Convergence, Richard Baldwin, an economist at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, gives us an idea why, over the past generation, globalization’s benefits have been so hard to explain and its damage so hard to diagnose.

We have had “globalization,” in the sense of far-flung trade, for centuries now.

ut around 1990, the cost of sharing information at a distance fell dramatically. Workers on complex projects no longer had to cluster in the same factory, mill town, or even country. Other factors entered in. Tariffs fell. The rise of “Global English” as a common language of business reduced the cost of moving information (albeit at an exorbitant cost in culture). “Containerization” (the use of standard-sized shipping containers across road, rail, and sea transport) made packing and shipping predictable and helped break the world’s powerful longshoremen’s unions. Active “pro-business” political reforms did the rest.

Far-flung “global value chains” replaced assembly lines. Corporations came to do some of the work of governments, because in the free-trade climate imposed by the U.S., they could play governments off against one another. Globalization is not about nations anymore. It is not about products. And the most recent elections showed that it has not been about people for a long time. No, it is about tasks.

his means a windfall for what used to be called the Third World. More than 600 million people have been pulled out of dire poverty. They can get richer by building parts of things.

The competition that globalization has created for manufacturing has driven the value-added in manufacturing down close to what we would think of as zilch. The lucrative work is in the design and the P.R.—the brainy, high-paying stuff that we still get to do.

But only a tiny fraction of people in any society is equipped to do lucrative brainwork. In all Western societies, the new formula for prosperity is inconsistent with the old formula for democracy.

One of these platitudes is that all nations gain from trade. Baldwin singles out Harvard professor and former George W. Bush Administration economic adviser Gregory Mankiw, who urged passage of the Obama Administration mega-trade deals TPP and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on the grounds that America should “work in those industries in which we have an advantage compared with other nations, and we should import from abroad those goods that can be produced more cheaply there.”

That was a solid argument 200 years ago, when the British economist David Ricardo developed modern doctrines of trade. In practical terms, it is not always solid today. What has changed is the new mobility of knowledge. But knowledge is a special commodity. It can be reused. Several people can use it at the same time. It causes people to cluster in groups, and tends to grow where those groups have already clustered.

When surgeries involved opening the patient up like a lobster or a peapod, the doctor had to be in physical contact with a patient. New arthroscopic processes require the surgeon to guide cutting and cauterizing tools by computer. That computer did not have to be in the same room. And if it did not, why did it have to be in the same country? In 2001, a doctor in New York performed surgery on a patient in Strasbourg. In a similar way, the foreman on the American factory floor could now coordinate production processes in Mexico. Each step of the production process could now be isolated, and then offshored. This process, Baldwin writes, “broke up Team America by eroding American labor’s quasi-monopoly on using American firms’ know-how.”

To explain why the idea that all nations win from trade isn’t true any longer, Baldwin returns to his teamwork metaphor. In the old Ricardian world that most policymakers still inhabit, the international economy could be thought of as a professional sports league. Trading goods and services resembled trading players from one team to another. Neither team would carry out the deal unless it believed it to be in its own interests. Nowadays, trade is more like an arrangement by which the manager of the better team is allowed to coach the lousier one in his spare time.

Vietnam, which does low-level assembly of wire harnesses for Honda. This does not mean Vietnam has industrialized, but nations like it no longer have to.

In the work of Thomas Friedman and other boosters you find value chains described as kaleidoscopic, complex, operating in a dozen different countries. Those are rare. There is less to “global value chains” than meets the eye. Most of them, Baldwin shows, are actually regional value chains. As noted, they exist on the periphery of the United States, Europe, or Japan. In this, offshoring resembles the elaborate international transactions that Florentine bankers under the Medicis engaged in for the sole purpose of avoiding church strictures on moneylending.

One way of describing outsourcing is as a verdict on the pay structure that had arisen in the West by the 1970s: on trade unions, prevailing-wage laws, defined-benefit pension plans, long vacations, and, more generally, the power workers had accumulated against their bosses.

In 1993, during the first month of his presidency, Bill Clinton outlined some of the promise of a world in which “the average 18-year-old today will change jobs seven times in a lifetime.” How could anyone ever have believed in, tolerated, or even wished for such a thing? A person cannot productively invest the resources of his only life if he’s going to be told every five years that everything he once thought solid has melted into ait.

The more so since globalization undermines democracy, in the ways we have noted. Global value chains are extraordinarily delicate. They are vulnerable to shocks. Terrorists have discovered this. In order to work, free-trade systems must be frictionless and immune to interruption, forever. This means a program of intellectual property protection, zero tariffs, and cross-border traffic in everything, including migrants. This can be assured only in a system that is veto-proof and non-consultative—in short, undemocratic.

Sheltered from democracy, the economy of the free trade system becomes more and more a private space.

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Caldwell, C. (2014, November). Twilight of Democracy. CRB, 14(4).

Caldwell’s book review of
Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011. SCSU Library: https://mplus.mnpals.net/vufind/Record/007359076  Call Number: JC11 .F85 2011

http://www.claremont.org/crb/article/twilight-of-democracy/

Fukuyama’s first volume opened with China’s mandarin bureaucracy rather than the democracy of ancient Athens, shifting the methods of political science away from specifically Western intellectual genealogies and towards anthropology. Nepotism and favor-swapping are man’s basic political motivations, as Fukuyama sees it. Disciplining those impulses leads to effective government, but “repatrimonialization”—the capture of government by private interests—threatens whenever vigilance is relaxed. Fukuyama’s new volume, which describes political order since the French Revolution, extends his thinking on repatrimonialization, from the undermining of meritocratic bureaucracy in Han China through the sale of offices under France’s Henri IV to the looting of foreign aid in post-colonial Zaire. Fukuyama is convinced that the United States is on a similar path of institutional decay.

Political philosophy asks which government is best for man. Political science asks which government is best for government. Political decline, Fukuyama insists, is not the same thing as civilizational collapse.

Fukuyama is not the first to remark that wars can spur government efficiency—even if front-line soldiers are the last to benefit from it.

Relative to the smooth-running systems of northwestern Europe, American bureaucracy has been a dud, riddled with corruption from the start and resistant to reform. Patronage—favors for individual cronies and supporters—has thrived.

Clientelism is an ambiguous phenomenon: it is bread and circuses, it is race politics, it is doing favors for special classes of people. Clientelism is both more democratic and more systemically corrupting than the occasional nepotistic appointment.

why modern mass liberal democracy has developed on clientelistic lines in the U.S. and meritocratic ones in Europe. In Europe, democracy, when it came, had to adapt itself to longstanding pre-democratic institutions, and to governing elites that insisted on established codes and habits. Where strong states precede democracy (as in Germany), bureaucracies are efficient and uncorrupt. Where democracy precedes strong states (as in the United States but also Greece and Italy), government can be viewed by the public as a piñata.

Fukuyama contrasts the painstaking Japanese development of Taiwan a century ago with the mess that the U.S. Congress, “eager to impose American models of government on a society they only dimly understood,” was then making of the Philippines. It is not surprising that Fukuyama was one of the most eloquent conservative critics of the U.S. invasion of Iraq from the very beginning.

What distinguishes once-colonized Vietnam and China and uncolonized Japan and Korea from these Third World basket cases is that the East Asian lands “all possess competent, high-capacity states,” in contrast to sub-Saharan Africa, which “did not possess strong state-level institutions.”

Fukuyama does not think ethnic homogeneity is a prerequisite for successful politics

the United States “suffers from the problem of political decay in a more acute form than other democratic political systems.” It has kept the peace in a stagnant economy only by dragooning women into the workplace and showering the working and middle classes with credit.

public-sector unions have colluded with the Democratic Party to make government employment more rewarding for those who do it and less responsive to the public at large. In this sense, government is too big. But he also believes that cutting taxes on the rich in hopes of spurring economic growth has been a fool’s errand, and that the beneficiaries of deregulation, financial and otherwise, have grown to the point where they have escaped bureaucratic control altogether. In this sense, government is not big enough.

Washington, as Fukuyama sees it, is a patchwork of impotence and omnipotence—effective where it insists on its prerogatives, ineffective where it has been bought out. The unpredictable results of democratic oversight have led Americans to seek guidance in exactly the wrong place: the courts, which have both exceeded and misinterpreted their constitutional responsibilities.  the almost daily insistence of courts that they are liberating people by removing discretion from them gives American society a Soviet cast.

“Effective modern states,” he writes, “are built around technical expertise, competence, and autonomy.”

http://librev.com/index.php/2013-03-30-08-56-39/discussion/culture/3234-gartziya-i-problemite-na-klientelistkata-darzhava

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Williams, J. (2017, May). The Dumb Politics of Elite Condescension. NYT

https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/05/27/opinion/sunday/the-dumb-politics-of-elite-condescension.html

the sociologists Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb call the “hidden injuries of class.” These are dramatized by a recent employment study, in which the sociologists Lauren A. Rivera and Andras Tilcsik sent 316 law firms résumés with identical and impressive work and academic credentials, but different cues about social class. The study found that men who listed hobbies like sailing and listening to classical music had a callback rate 12 times higher than those of men who signaled working-class origins, by mentioning country music, for example.

Politically, the biggest “hidden injury” is the hollowing out of the middle class in advanced industrialized countries. For two generations after World War II, working-class whites in the United States enjoyed a middle-class standard of living, only to lose it in recent decades.

The college-for-all experiment did not work. Two-thirds of Americans are not college graduates. We need to continue to make college more accessible, but we also need to improve the economic prospects of Americans without college degrees.

the United States has a well-documented dearth of workers qualified for middle-skill jobs that pay $40,000 or more a year and require some postsecondary education but not a college degree. A 2014 report by Accenture, Burning Glass Technologies and Harvard Business School found that a lack of adequate middle-skills talent affects the productivity of “47 percent of manufacturing companies, 35 percent of health care and social assistance companies, and 21 percent of retail companies.”

Skillful, a partnership among the Markle Foundation, LinkedIn and Colorado, is one initiative pointing the way. Skillful helps provide marketable skills for job seekers without college degrees and connects them with employers in need of middle-skilled workers in information technology, advanced manufacturing and health care. For more information, see my other IMS blog entries, such ashttp://blog.stcloudstate.edu/ims/2017/01/11/credly-badges-on-canvas/

Hobsbawm and history

The age of extremes : a history of the world, 1914-1991 /

by Hobsbawm, E. J. (Eric J.), 1917-
Published: New York : Pantheon Books, c1994.

Location Call Number Status
St. Cloud State University MC Main Collection – 2nd floor D421 .H582 1994

The Last Romantic

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2003/11/20/the-last-romantic/

http://librev.com/index.php/scribbbles-essays-publisher/2921-2016-02-15-09-21-11

 

honors and shame

221 HONORS.
The Honor System:
A Comparison Between the U.S. South and the Mediterranean World

Plamen Miltenoff, MLIS, Ph.D.

Meeting Times & Places

5:00 pm – 7:30 pm Wednesdays Miller Center 206

  • Asynchronous interaction:
    • Most of the discussions will occur asynchronously in the D2L “Discussion” area.
    • Use of Web 2.0 tools such as blogs and wikis is strongly encouraged.
    • Use of Web 2.0 tools such as social networking sites (e.g., Facebook) only after consultation with the instructor

Contact Information

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The best way to contact me is through email, but you can use any of the options below.

Email: pmiltenoff@stcloudstate.edu
Phone: 320-308-3072
Web Site: http://web.stcloudstate.edu/pmiltenoff/faculty
Office Location: Miller Center, 204-J

Course Description:

The Honor system is a phenomenon well known in many cultures across the globe and strongly presented in cultures since Ancient Greece and Rome. The concepts of honor and shame have long been associated with cultures in the Mediterranean region mostly because the first scholars to study the social impact of these concepts did so in Southern Europe. Honor has two fundamental components: birth and morality. People could gain or lose their honor by the morality of their conduct. Despite the scholarly emphasis on the Mediterranean, the concept of honor influenced social systems all over the world, and historians are beginning to detect its traces in places as different as China and Africa. The Southern Honor system can firmly be traced back in the European roots and determined to a great degree the American history of the 19th century.

This course will study the geography, history, sociology and religions, cultural and political systems of two worlds and learn to compare the findings. Based on those comparisons, lessons in gender, culture and politics will be drawn.

  1. What is Honor and Shame system and why is it so important to know about it and recognize it
  2. What is the connection between the Honor system in the Mediterranean and in the American South
  3. How does the knowledge of the Honor system aim our daily actions and our global perspective

Course Goals

Students in this course will

  • Practice research methods and ability to find and evaluate information as well as select reliable information technologies.
  • Explore applications and technologies for communication and creative collaboration.
  • Gain practical, hands-on experience with a wide variety of research and online communication tools.
  • Students will demonstrate ability to research and find academically reliable information from peer-reviewed sources in the online databases, which SCSU is subscribed. Students will demonstrate ability to find and evaluate information from the Internet.
  • Students will demonstrate competencies in creation of textual and multimedia narratives in individual and collaborative environment.
  • Students will demonstrate competencies in application of technology toward creation and dissemination of textual and multimedia materials.

Attendance/Discussion Requirements

  • Attendance is required. If you cannot attend class, it is required to alert the instructor in advance. If the reason for the absence is an emergency, it is expected to approach the instructor and provide an explanation thereafter about the character of the emergency.
  • Discussion are expected. If you are shy and are hesitant to participate in class, you must compensate with the use of other communication tools (e.g., D2L Discussion List).

Assignment Descriptions

  • Discussions. You are expected to contribute to each class session with your ideas and your responses to the ideas of your peers. Your comments are expected in class and in between class sessions (using, e.g., D2L discussion list). Your comments must go beyond “yes, I agree,” and “no, I disagree” and provide analysis and synthesis of your thoughts.
  • Readings – you will be expected to contribute to each class sessions with bibliographical findings on your own.
  • Written responses – you will be expected to deliver four written responses to peer-reviewed articles related to topics discussed in the class sessions.
  • Final project – you will be expected to write and present a final project. The written part of the project will be in the realm of 4-5000 words; will adhere to academic research and style; will include a bibliography with at least 2/3 of the sources being peer-reviewed and outside of the 5000 words. The presentation can be of any multimedia form, whereas it will be peer-evaluated, but my (instructor’s) preference will be given to advance multimedia presentations (beyond PPT and using e.g. Prezy, iMovie/Moviemaker movie and/or audio narration)

Course Policies

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Late Assignment Policy

All assignments should be submitted by midnight of the date on which they are due. Ten percent of an assignment’s point value will be removed for each day an assignment is late. This policy will be adjusted on a case-by-case basis if emergencies prevent you from submitting an assignment on time. In these situations, contact me as soon as is reasonable to determine how this policy can be adjusted in a way that meets your needs and is still fair to other students.

Grading

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The grade book in D2L will be used to show detailed information about grades in this course. The table below shows the value of each assignment and the total number of points available.

  Overall Grade
94% – 100% = A
90 % – 93.99% = A-
86% – 89.99% = B+
83% – 85.99% = B
80% – 82.99% = B-
70% – 79.99% = C
60% – 69.99% = D
59.99% or lower = F

 

Assignments Schedule

WEEK 1. August 28
Reading[s]:
Peruse through all articles in the D2L content area. Choose one article to your liking and be ready to reflect on it.Assignment[s]:
1. complete entry survey. 2. Prepare to present in coherent and concise manner your understanding of Honors and Shame and discuss the goals for this course. 3. Enter a short essay in the D2L discussion on how do you see applying the knowledge from this course in your future studies, research and work
Introduction.  Orientation, class parameters and familiarizing with the syllabus. Questions and issues. Course goals What is an/the Honor System? Entry Interview (D2L survey is completed and analyzed). Why explore this topic and these vastly different geographic entities (US South and the Mediterranean). Define interest in this class and interest for a project; how this class can help your studies? Your career? All over as a human being?
WEEK 2.Sept 4

Reading[s]:
BUSATTA, S. (2006). Honour and Shame in the Mediterranean. Antrocom, 2(2). 75-78. Retrieved March 19, 2013, from http://www.academia.edu/524890/Honour_and_Shame_in_the_Mediterranean
Moxnes, V. (1996). Honor and Shame. In R. L. Rohrbaugh (Ed.). The Social Sciences and New Testament Interpretation (pp. 19-40). Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson.   http://tinyurl.com/qdvc499. (p. 24-26).
Osiek, C. (2008). Women, honor, and context in Mediterranean antiquity, 64(1), 323–337. doi:10.4102/hts.v64i1.2
Esmer, T. U. (n.d.). Honor in Ottoman and Contemporary Mediterranean Societies: Controversies, Continuities, and New Directions. conference announcement. Retrieved from http://www.h-net.org/announce/show.cgi?ID=196551

Assignment[s]: 1. Find an article on Honor and Shame. 2. Outline in two paragraphs the content of one of the three articles and in a third paragraph compare to your findings; use academic style to log your responses. If you have hesitation about your style, please check with the Write Place, your peers and me.

Why research? Work on the reading material for class

Find articles for the course.

What is academic research? What is a peer-review article? When and how research the Internet. How do I access and keep track of resources.
RefWorks versus Zotero and Mendeley
What is an academic paper. How do I write an academic paper. The Write place.
Making plans: final project
WEEK 3. Sept 11

Reading[s]:
Osiek, C. (2008). Women, honor, and context in Mediterranean antiquity, 64(1), 323–337. doi:10.4102/hts.v64i1.2
Smith, A. (2004). Murder in Jerba: Honour, Shame and Hospitality among Maltese in Ottoman Tunisia. History and Anthropology Routledge, 15(2), 107–132.
Harris, J. W. (2002). Honor, Grace, and War (But Not Slavery?) in Southern Culture. Reviews in American History, 30(1), 1–7. doi:10.2307/30031707

Assignment[s]:
Your first written response is due in the D2L   dropbox. Your response must adhere to the requirements of an academic paper, including in-text citation and bibliography.

Honors and Shame from a historical perspective Do we have a robust theory/notion about the Honor/Shame system through the centuries? Do you think tracking that model through centuries helps in the 21st century? If yes, how and if no, why?
WEEK 4. Sept 18

Reading[s]: Fernand Braudel (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fernand_Braudel) and the Annales School
Santos, N. F. (2008). Family, Patronage, and Social Contests: Narrative Reversals in the Gospel of Mark. S&J, (2). (footnote p. 200).
Hall, J. L. (1907). Half-hours in southern history. B. F. Johnson publishing co.
Harrell, L. A. (2009, December 4). It’s an honorable choice: Rebellions Against Southern Honor in William Styron’s The Confessions of Nat Turner. Retrieved from http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/resolver/1840.16/2614

Assignment[s]:
Your second written response is due in the D2L dropbox. Your response must adhere to the requirements of an academic paper, including in-text citation and bibliography.

Honors and Shame from a geographic perspective Is there a “southern” connection (Mediterranean is the European South)? Can be Annale School be right (geography and relief determines history)? To what degree geography and geographical conditions determine such models (Honor/Shame)?
WEEK 5. Sept 25

Reading[s]: Crook, Z. (2009). Honor, Shame, and Social Status Revisited. Journal of Biblical Literature, 128(3), 591–611.
Moxnes, V. (1996). Honor and Shame. In R. L. Rohrbaugh (Ed.). The Social Sciences and New Testament Interpretation (pp. 19-40). Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson. http://tinyurl.com/qdvc499 (p. 22)
Lever, A. (1986). Honour as a Red Herring. Critique of Anthropology, 6(3), 83–106. doi:10.1177/0308275X8600600305

Assignment[s]:
Your third written response is due in the D2L   dropbox. Your response must adhere to the requirements of an academic paper, including in-text citation and bibliography.

Honors and Shame from a cultural perspective. Gender roles, Masculinity Does the Honor/Shame model help understand gender roles, social status, masculinity etc.?
WEEK 6. Oct 2

Reading[s]:
Crook, Z. (2009). Honor, Shame, and Social Status Revisited. Journal of Biblical Literature, 128(3), 591–611. (p. 593)
Moxnes, V. (1996). Honor and Shame. In R. L. Rohrbaugh (Ed.). The Social Sciences and New Testament Interpretation (pp. 19-40). Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson. http://tinyurl.com/qdvc499. (p. 26-27; p. 30-33).
Cohen, D. (n.d.). Insult, Aggression, and the Southern Culture of Honor: An “Experimental Ethnography.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), 945–960.
Harris, J. W. (2002). Honor, Grace, and War (But Not Slavery?) in Southern Culture. Reviews in American History, 30(1), 1–7. doi:10.2307/30031707

Assignment[s]:
Your forth written response is due in the D2L   dropbox. Your response must adhere to the requirements of an academic paper, including in-text citation and bibliography.

Honors and Shame from a political and social perspective Can Honor/Shame be connected with the current political situation in Egypt, Syria, Turkey? Did Honor/Shame system influence decision in American history?
WEEK 7. Wednesday Oct 9

Assignment[s]: final project details

Start working on the final project Present and discuss your final project: 1. Finalized title 2. Outline 3. Plan 4. Clear work distribution among group members 5. Clear way for peer assessment.
 WEEK 8. Wednesday Oct 16
Assignment[s]: details on final project
Final brainstorming and start working on the project Meeting as a whole: 1. Present group’s plan to class. 2. Share group’s ideas with class. 3. Share technology 4. Share sources 5. Share means for peer assessment
WEEK 9. Wednesday Oct 23

Assignment[s]: draft of bibliography

Class as a whole: peer review and brainstorming Meeting as a whole: 1. Are sources reliable? 2. Are sources of academic origin (peer-reviewed)? 3. Is the bibliography adhering correctly to the formats (APA, Chicago, ALA)
WEEK 10. Wednesday Oct 30

Assignment[s]: details on presentation

Work on the final project Meeting as a whole: 1. Presentation format 2. Share technology 3. Share ideas
WEEK 11. Wednesday Nov 6
Assignment[s]: paper draft due in D2L dropbox
Work on final project Meeting as a whole: share group’s progress and seek other group’s feedback
WEEK 12. Wednesday Nov 13
Assignment[s]: paper draft and presentation
Work on project Meeting as a whole: share group’s progress and seek other group’s feedback
WEEK 13. Wednesday Nov 20
Assignment[s]: paper draft due in D2L dropbox
Work on project Meeting as a whole: share group’s progress and seek other group’s feedback
WEEK 13. Wednesday Nov 27
Work on project Meeting as a whole: share group’s progress and seek other group’s feedback
WEEK 13. Wednesday Dec 4
Assignment[s]: paper final draft due in D2L dropbox
presentations Class presentations of the final projects
WEEK 13. Wednesday Dec 11
presentations Class presentations of the final projects

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Bertram Wyatt-Brown. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://personal.tcu.edu/swoodworth/Wyatt-Brown.htm

Brayford, S. A. (1999). TO SHAME OR NOT TO SHAME: SEXUALITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN DIASPORA. Semeia, (87), 163.

BUSATTA, S. (2006). Honour and Shame in the Mediterranean. Antrocom, 2(2). 75-78. Retrieved March 19, 2013, from http://www.academia.edu/524890/Honour_and_Shame_in_the_Mediterranean

Cohen, D. (n.d.). Insult, Aggression, and the Southern Culture of Honor: An “Experimental Ethnography.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), 945–960.

Crook, Z. (2009). Honor, Shame, and Social Status Revisited. Journal of Biblical Literature, 128(3), 591–611.

Culture of honor (Southern United States). (n.d.). Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_of_honor_(Southern_United_States)

Dussere, E. (2001). The Debts of History: Southern Honor, Affirmative Action, and Faulkner’s Intruder in the Dust. Faulkner Journal, 17(1), 37–57.

Esmer, T. U. (n.d.). Honor in Ottoman and Contemporary Mediterranean Societies: Controversies, Continuities, and New Directions. conference announcement. Retrieved from http://www.h-net.org/announce/show.cgi?ID=196551

Family, Patronage, and Social Contests.pdf. (n.d.).

Hall, J. L. (1907). Half-hours in southern history. B. F. Johnson publishing co.

Harrell, L. A. (2009, December 4). It’s an honorable choice: Rebellions Against Southern Honor in William Styron’s The Confessions of Nat Turner. Retrieved from http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/resolver/1840.16/2614

Harris, J. W. (2002). Honor, Grace, and War (But Not Slavery?) in Southern Culture. Reviews in American History, 30(1), 1–7. doi:10.2307/30031707

Hellerman. (n.d.). Reconstructing Honor in Roman Philippi. Cambridge University Press.

Herzfeld, M. (1980). Honour and Shame: Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Moral Systems. Man, 15(2), 339–351. doi:10.2307/2801675

Honor, Shame, and Social Status.pdf. (n.d.).

honor-04-Antrocom_Honour and Shame in the Mediterranean_S.pdf. (n.d.).

Honors and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3317790

Honour and shame (Anthropology). (n.d.). Retrieved from http://what-when-how.com/social-and-cultural-anthropology/honour-and-shame-anthropology/

Lever, A. (1986). Honour as a Red Herring. Critique of Anthropology, 6(3), 83–106. doi:10.1177/0308275X8600600305

Manly Honor Part V: Honor in the American South. (n.d.). The Art of Manliness. Retrieved August 15, 2013, from http://www.artofmanliness.com/2012/11/26/manly-honor-part-v-honor-in-the-american-south/

Moxnes, V. (1996). Honor and Shame. In R. L. Rohrbaugh (Ed.). The Social Sciences and New Testament Interpretation (pp. 19-40). Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson. http://tinyurl.com/qdvc499

Murder in Jerba_ Honour, Shame and.pdf. (n.d.).

Osiek, C. (2008). Women, honor, and context in Mediterranean antiquity, 64(1), 323–337. doi:10.4102/hts.v64i1.2

Peoples and Cultures of the Mediterranean. (n.d.). Retrieved March 19, 2013, from http://www.academia.edu/2437701/Peoples_and_Cultures_of_the_Mediterranean

Rabichev, R. (n.d.). The Mediterranean concepts of honour and shame as seen in the depiction of the biblical women. Retrieved from http://prophetess.lstc.edu/~rklein/Doc6/renata.htm

Santos, N. F. (2008). Family, Patronage, and Social Contests: Narrative Reversals in the Gospel of Mark. S&J, (2).

Slavery and Southern Honor. (n.d.). StudyMode. Education. Retrieved from http://www.studymode.com/essays/Slavery-Southern-Honor-72644.html

Smith, A. (2004). Murder in Jerba: Honour, Shame and  Hospitality among Maltese in Ottoman  Tunisia. History and Anthropology Routledge, 15(2), 107–132.

Stewart,, Y. (n.d.). Mursi: A Study in Honor-Shame dynamics. CATEGORY ARCHIVES: HONOR-SHAME CULTURE. Retrieved from http://www.theaugeanstables.com/category/honor-shame-culture/

TO SHAME OR NOT TO SHAME_ SEXUALITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN DIASPORA..pdf. (n.d.).

Weir, D. (n.d.). Honour and Shame. Islam Watch. Retrieved from http://www.islam-watch.org/Others/Honour-and-Shame-in-Islam.htm

Women, honor, and context in Mediterranean antiquity.pdf. (n.d.).

Wyatt-Brown, B. & Milbauer, Richard J. (2004). Honor, Shame, and Iraq in American Foreign Policy. In Note prepared for the Workshop on Humiliation and Violent Conflict, Columbia University,  New York, November 18-19, 2004. Presented at the Workshop on Humiliation and Violent Conflict, Columbia University,  New York,. Retrieved from http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/WyattBrownNY04meeting.pdf

 

 

 

SocioInt2015

http://socioint15.org

SOCIO-INT15- 2nd INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EDUCATION SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES will be held in Istanbul (Turkey), on the 8th, 9th and 10th of June 2015 is an interdisciplinary international conference that invites academics, independent scholars and researchers from around the world to meet and exchange the latest ideas and discuss issues concerning all fields of Education, Social Sciences and Humanities.

Socioint15_Accepted_Abstracts1

SOCIO-INT15 provides the ideal opportunity to bring together professors, researchers and high education students of different disciplines, discuss new issues, and discover the most recent developments, new trends and researches in education, social sciences and humanities.

Academics making efforts in education, subfields of which might include higher education, early childhood education, adult education, special education, e-learning, language education, etc. are highly welcomed. People without papers can also participate in this conference as audience so long as they find it interesting and meaningful.

Due to the nature of the conference with its focus on innovative ideas and developments, papers also related to all areas of social sciences including communication, accounting, finance, economics, management, business, marketing, education, sociology, psychology, political science, law and other areas of social sciences; also all areas of humanities including anthropology, archaelogy, architecture, art, ethics, folklore studies, history, language studies, literature, methodological studies, music, philosophy, poetry and theater are invited for the international conference.

Submitted papers will be subject to peer review and evaluated based on originality and clarity of exposition.